

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0

\*NSC Review Completed\*

14 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes on Fourth Meeting, NSCIC Working Group,  
13 June 1972, 1430 hours

1. Present were:

Members:

Chairman	Mr. Bronson Tweedy, D/DCI/IC
NSC	Mr. Andrew Marshall
State Department	Dr. Ray Cline
Defense Department	Mr. Seymour Weiss
	Dr. Albert Hall, ASD/I
	Lt. Gen. Donald Bennett, D/DIA
	Maj. Gen. John H. Elder, Jr.
	(representing Vice Adm. Weinert)
Justice Department	Mr. Bernard A. Wells
	(representing Kevin T. Maroney)
CIA	Dr. Edward Proctor, DDI
	[redacted]
	(representing John Huizenga, D/ONE)

25X1A9A

25X1A9A

Executive Secretary:

Observer:

State Department

Mr. Richard Curl

2. Minutes of 12 April meeting. Approved without comment.

3. Terms of reference for Working Group. Approved without change. Dr. Cline noted a masterful job had been done in accommodating the differing views expressed by the members.

[redacted]

25X1

Mr. Marshall reported the study would be out soon. It will consist of his 10-page covering memorandum, a 35-page report prepared by the three-man working group, and about 200 pages in annexes. Mr. Marshall said he understood the study was still in Secretary Irwin's office for security clearance, but Dr. Cline thought this already had been accomplished. Dr. Cline noted this was a meaty study which would provoke much thought.

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0  
DIA and NSC review(s) completed.

~~SECRET~~

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0

The Chairman said his office would distribute the study by special courier as soon as it was received and that the members would have ten days for review preparatory to a meeting which would be called to consider the document.

5. Evaluation of intelligence inputs to NSSM-69.

The Chairman said that since this would be the first of a series of evaluations to be considered by the Working Group, he felt focus should be on two matters: first, how could the approach taken, the format, the procedures, etc., be improved upon; and second, a clear understanding of the purpose of the exercise - which is to make a synthesis and draw conclusions for the NSCIC so that the NSCIC can issue guidance to the intelligence community in accordance with the President's 5 November directive.

Mr. Marshall said he felt the mechanism of the effort had gone well, although he would want a better mix of participants next time (with fewer who had actually been involved in developing the intelligence inputs). One person had done the basic study and then brought in a panel to examine the issues. This had been possible because the amount of material was quite circumscribed (four or five reports), but the same system could not be used in the India/Pakistan study because of the mass of materials.

Mr. Weiss thought the discussion should be in two phases: first, talk about the report; then, how it could be used.

On substance, he felt the report was interesting, provocative and useful, but it reflected a distorted point of view. Concerning the problem of locating missile sites (which the paper indicated had not been recognized until late in the NSSM process), Mr. Weiss said that in both interagency and internal discussions State had explicitly recognized this problem and on this basis had questioned any preemptive strike strategy. He noted that Maj. Gen. Lukeman had conceded the JCS did not claim it would be possible to destroy all missiles.

Dr. Proctor said this was only one of many instances in which the paper was inaccurate because it had not been vetted with personnel who knew the situation. Dr. Hall asked for an example, and Dr. Proctor said there was a whole series of examples. He cited that the comments of [ ] cited in the study re the substantial autonomy of PRC regional military districts were incorrect. Mr. Marshall said this was not important since it had been cited only as an example, and Dr. Proctor replied that examples should be found which are true.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Weiss emphasized that he was not saying that differences in perspective as to how well the job had been done should not be sought, but on central points, such as the problem of missile location, it must be recognized that "some views paralleled the paper", (i.e., the blanket criticism should not be applied to State.)

Dr. Cline felt that by focusing so narrowly on the formal papers the study missed the point, and there was need to examine "the legislative history" and the material that was presented orally. Such information might be presented in an annex to the study.

The Chairman said that a study such as this should present an accurate background on the history of the development of the papers being evaluated and not merely look at the finished papers.

Dr. Cline commented that he considered the paper was misleading in some respects.

The Chairman said that as a first paper the NSSM-69 study may not be as useful as those which will follow for there will be an opportunity to refine the format.

Mr. Weiss noted that, as a first paper, this one will be examined very critically, and some who can be expected to be critical should be contacted and their views considered in compilation of the paper.

Mr. Marshall said that the study effort was intended to focus on the intelligence inputs.

The Chairman agreed, but said that the tasking was an important element of this and the tasking had not been critiqued in the paper.

Mr. Weiss considered this a good point and added that the request for NSSM-69 should be an annex to the study. He noted the request put major emphasis on force sizing and since authority for the study was vested in the Defense Department, this was to be expected, but the lack of attention to political matters had been recognized from the start (and was not, therefore, an intelligence deficiency).

Dr. Cline said that political analysts tried hard to develop inputs on the constraints on Chinese action but such texts were discarded in drafting of the final papers.

Mr. Marshall said the responses from persons involved in the paper included statements about maximum threats, etc.

3  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0

General Elder said that the treatment in the study of hard and soft constraints did not reflect the discussions during development of the NSSM, during which the probability of soft constraints on PRC actions was examined. He felt that inclusion of force planners in the study group that prepared the evaluation study would have helped with identification of the issues.

Mr. Weiss considered the soft constraints should have been expressed more explicitly in NSSM-69, and General Elder agreed.

Dr. Hall said he wished the NSSM-69 study was the second paper to be considered, and not the first. He noted one difficulty was that the stated objectives were not the ones which the study addressed. A mechanism was needed for putting papers such as this one together. The paper must be accurate and should be corrected if it is not. The Working Group might want to send a memorandum forward with the study indicating what had been learned. He asked Mr. Marshall to describe these lessons.

The Chairman suggested that Mr. Marshall be tasked to write, on the basis of the afternoon's discussion, a paper which could be forwarded to the NSCIC. He noted that there is much in the current draft concerning which the intelligence community should be apprised, but the first step would be to convert the study to a form in which it could go to the NSCIC.

Dr. Hall asked if this meant a forwarding memorandum.

The Chairman replied that the NSCIC needed a distillation of the paper and this would be what would be disseminated to the community. He considered that the discussion had indicated that the NSCIC would have difficulty in assimilating the paper in its present form.

Dr. Cline said that, first, he would like a chance to make detailed written comments on the paper. Then, when the study had been rewritten into a new paper, the Working Group could distill the lessons it wanted to send to the NSCIC.

The Chairman noted that there was no immediate time pressure to get something to the NSCIC.

General Bennett said he would like to see two things stressed -- what we were driving at, and what our objectives were -- and the present paper does not make these clear. He said that DIA had problems in the support of this effort within DOD and several of the participating offices were not experienced.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0

Dr. Proctor said he would like to see a clearer differentiation between what applied to intelligence and what had broader implications. He felt that those involved in this paper had learned a lot about intelligence and about how to conduct such a study, but he noted that there are answers to some of the issues raised in the study, but no consideration was given to such answers. He noted in particular that CIA had provided answers on issues raised regarding overhead photography of missile sites, but the answers had been ignored in the study.

Dr. Cline noted that far more data is available than is indicated in the study.

Dr. Hall said that in his view three or four key issues had dominated in the NSSM-69 effort and these key questions related to the intelligence situation. He wondered whether these issues had been properly identified and efforts made to develop answers to them.

Dr. Cline doubted there had been systematic effort but he thought participants probably had followed through. He felt that an important part of the process should be to identify problems and then determine whether anything could be done about them. A more systematic attempt to follow through might be made, but the problem is that studies of this type are never really finished.

Dr. Hall said NSSM-69 was prepared under pressure and the participants then went off to the next fire drill.

General Bennett said that DIA does handle this matter systematically. Those who draft major papers identify the questions which cannot be answered and these are referred to collection and production shops to see what can be done about them. He said this is a continuing program within DIA.

General Elder said that these queries also go back to the operations personnel.

Dr. Hall felt it still would be interesting to identify the pivotal questions raised in NSSM-69 and see what had been done about them.

Dr. Cline noted that there used to be a post mortem exercise on national intelligence estimates which did this and General Bennett said that the system he had within DIA does provide a systematic follow-on.

Mr. Marshall said that unless there is follow-up, the next time the issue arises you are in no better position than before but Dr. Proctor added that when this "next time" occurs the issues are new.

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0

~~SECRET~~

The Chairman added that there was no categorical limitation on the number of lessons to be learned which could be cited.

Dr. Proctor said his concerns with the paper will be handled by a detailed memorandum which he will submit as his comments. He noted, however, that with respect to hard and soft constraints on PRC behavior, the likelihood of getting good data on soft constraints is very limited. China has shown less continuity in institutional constraints than have other countries and any attempt to use soft constraints as guidance for future PRC action involves very high risk.

The Chairman noted that China tends to do what is out of pattern or what is unexpected.

Dr. Cline said one conclusion he drew was that there are many key questions which can be translated into lessons learned but he felt the group should carefully develop the format and style of the study in order to make it of maximum usefulness. He raised a question as to why State had not been included on the review panel and Mr. Marshall agreed State probably should have been.

The Chairman closed the discussion by stating that Working Group members would have two weeks in which to submit written comments on the study to him. He will get them to Mr. Marshall by special courier and will circulate them to members of the Working Group.

6. Selection of next topics for study.

Mr. Marshall raised the question of what studies the group wanted to do next, noting there is a long startup time.

The Chairman indicated he considered it more important to firmly get on top of the NSSM-69 and India/Pakistan studies first.

Dr. Cline agreed the group should squeeze all it could from these two studies, but since lead times were really long, the group ought to identify follow-on topics.

Dr. Proctor said there were two points involved, one was starting a study and the other was making certain that good topics were selected. He felt it was important to formulate criteria for a suitable topic, determine that it is doable and make certain that the study effort will not interfere too much with ongoing hot projects. The Chairman noted that this problem of interference with analysts already working on a 24-hour day basis was an important reason for avoiding topics which are currently of extremely high interest.

Mr. Marshall again said the group should get serious about selection of topics.

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0

The Chairman commented that those members who had replied to his 17 May listing of topics proposed by Mr. Marshall had favored deferring further studies until the first two had been completed, but they also had indicated the priority in which they viewed the proposed topics.

General Elder said that what the group hoped to achieve from a study should be the basis for determining whether the study should be attempted.

Dr. Cline said that the Egypt/Israel ceasefire and the Lamson 719 projects looked OK. General Elder noted that these two have many characteristics in common and the lessons learned might tend to be the same lessons.

Dr. Proctor suggested a study of the EC-121 shootdown by North Korea -- the crisis period covered only a few days, it was the sort of thing that can occur "out of the blue" and it wasn't handled well by anyone. Such a crisis requires prompt decisions on a compressed time period, but the crisis significance is large. In this case, it turned out the U.S. could not do a thing. The only papers relating to the incident are in the White House and much of the work was done orally in the Situation Room. There were many intelligence questions raised by a variety of possible reactions which were posed.

General Bennett said that the EC-121 incident already has been studied from every angle possible. The lessons which can be learned from it do not relate primarily to intelligence but to how a government functions in a crisis situation. The intelligence support "was there."

Dr. Proctor added there was a demand at the time for intelligence to assess the feasibility of various government actions.

Dr. Hall said the group should go back to its objectives and think in terms of a memorandum to the NSCIC which points out lessons which were learned and things which should be done differently in the future. He felt the topic to be chosen should be one "that will send us further down the road."

General Elder commented that the NSSM-69 study dealt with intelligence support for a rather simple policy problem and that the group should look at a more complex problem such as MBFR.

Dr. Proctor said the MBFR problem would be "unmanageable" and Dr. Cline said that this might be a good topic a couple of years hence but "we are still in the middle of it."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Weiss said that terms of reference for possible studies should be developed first as a guide to decision as to what actually should be studied. Assessing whether new perceptions were likely to be developed by a study would be easier if the terms of reference for the evaluation were first developed. He suggested that Mr. Marshall formulate such terms of reference.

Mr. Marshall replied that most members of the group "were around in these times" (referring to the topics he had proposed) "which is why I solicited your judgment."

Dr. Hall indicated any of the listed crisis studies would be satisfactory to him.

General Bennett noted that two kinds of studies had been proposed -- crisis studies, such as India/Pakistan, and policy studies, such as NSSM-69. He felt a crisis study of another type would be useful, but a study of the Egypt/Israel ceasefire would pose tremendous problems. Study of another policy problem might be difficult, but would have a real impact if it were possible to draw significant lessons from it.

Dr. Proctor agreed that the Egypt/Israel study would be very difficult to do, but General Bennett added that "we will learn much" from such a project.

25X1

said that a study of the Jordanian/Fedayeen/Iraqi situation, as proposed by Mr. Marshall, should provide some interesting lessons in intelligence analysis for support.

Dr. Cline suggested that Mr. Marshall prepare a feasibility study of all three topics (Egyptian/Israeli ceasefire, Lamson 719, and Jordanian/Fedayeen/Iraqi).

Mr. Marshall agreed to prepare a paper on each of the three topics indicating what it was proposed the study would be like, what it is hoped would be learned from the evaluation and what it appeared the problem areas would be.

With respect to the two proposed NSSM studies (NSSM-128, Nuclear Test Ban Policy, and MBFR), both Dr. Cline and Dr. Proctor strongly recommended against the MBFR as a topic. Dr. Proctor indicated that NSSM-128 will be considered at a Verification Panel meeting on 12 June. He did not consider an evaluation of the intelligence aspects of this NSSM would be complex, but Mr. Weiss wondered how useful it would be. He noted that verification seems to be receding in importance and that the intelligence aspects of the problem probably will "fall in line" with whatever the basic policy decision re verification turns out to be. General Elder and Dr. Proctor agreed.

8  
~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Mr. Marshall said the NSC staff was more interested in assessing what we know of Soviet nuclear technology, and Dr. Proctor indicated this was a different problem from that posed in NSSM-128. Mr. Weiss considered the technology problem really had a relation to NSSM-128 in view of the argument that a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) would favor the United States because of its higher level of current nuclear technology. He also thought NSSM-128 had a relationship to the MIRV problem since the USSR was not likely to be receptive to a CTB until it has a MIRV capability.

General Elder "went to the window again" for an MBFR study, and commented that if intelligence has no real contribution to make on this problem, it would be important to have this lack of capability certified.

Dr. Cline and Dr. Proctor argued that MBFR is not really an intelligence problem but is really a many-sided political problem, influenced markedly by attitudes on Capitol Hill. Dr. Cline said that "we have to study it, but we don't really understand it."

The Chairman asked the members to examine the NSSM list again to see if better proposals for study could not be put forward.

7. Terms of reference for a study of the production process.

(Copies of Dr. Hall's letter of 24 May on the audit of selected intelligence production by four task groups and of Dr. Cline's "Case Study on Intelligence Production," dated 26 May, were distributed to the members. Dr. Hall had sent his letter to the Chairman, and Dr. Cline had sent his to the Chairman and four other members of the Working Group. Dr. Hall had proposed four topics: the Soviet anti-ship missile, [redacted] logistic capability of the North Vietnamese and [redacted] activities. Dr. Cline had suggested a study of Libya, before and after the 1969 coup.)

25X1  
25X1

The Chairman opened the discussion by recommending that communications to the group be sent to him and he would be responsible for dissemination to all members. He noted that the ASD/I and INR/State proposals were quite different and that neither clearly indicated the purpose of the proposed studies nor their relation to objectives which were different from what were being considered for follow-on studies to the NSSM-69 evaluation.

He wondered, referring to Dr. Hall's letter, what body might be considered competent to assess the "professionalism" or "originality" of intelligence reporting on subjects of continuing interest, such as Yugoslavia, for instance, on which there was no particular policy problem or crisis action involvement.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0

Dr. Hall said that even though questions might be raised as to the particular topics, he considered we "could learn something useful" from study of the ones he had proposed.

General Bennett proposed two kinds of topics for study: one, how does intelligence assess a particular area; and, two, how does intelligence "support" itself in the Washington area, which involves consideration of balancing support for national and deployed command needs, making country analyses, handling different types of intelligence (scientific and technical, force analysis, political, etc.), and dividing effort among current, estimative and basic intelligence. He suggested that before the Working Group is through, it should look at the whole area of intelligence production and not merely at specialized types.

Dr. Proctor recommended the group look back to the NSCIC charter even though he understood the interest being evinced in evaluating how the intelligence community functions. He noted that how intelligence supports policy (as in NSSM-69) and how it functions in a crisis (as in the India/Pakistan crisis) can be handled internally, but any assessment as to how professional intelligence production is would have to be handled by persons from outside the government, providing they had the necessary expertise.

The Chairman did not consider that the suggested topics were responsive to the NSCIC charter, which focused on guidance to the intelligence community concerning consumer needs.

Mr. Marshall noted, however, that the NSCIC might decide it wanted a review of production by outside authorities. Dr. Hall added that he felt "we would be doing ourselves a service" to take a topic, look at it from a consumer-oriented viewpoint, and request participation from outside the government "as a means of self-protection." He conceded it was probably impossible to turn such a study completely over to an outside agency, but the task groups could include personnel both from inside the government and outside experts, who could be provided all of the material pertinent to the topic.

Dr. Proctor commented that such a study would be separate from consumer requirements, but Libya (the topic proposed by INR/State) gave him no problem.

Dr. Cline said he had suggested Libya because the fact that intelligence did not predict the coup is "always cited in State as an intelligence failure." He thought the group should pick a topic on which there is some standard for judgment. Dr. Proctor said there were more outside experts on Yugoslavia than on Libya, and [ ] commented that he knew of no good political scientist who is working on Libya.

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0

Dr. Proctor said the group should be interested only "in getting involved in studies that will show us something" and he considered both the anti-ship missile problem and the logistic capabilities of the North Vietnamese had been "beaten to death."

Dr. Hall felt, however, that if they were looked at again, it would be possible to draw some useful conclusions.

General Bennett said that he was concerned with these two problems on a day-to-day basis and he agreed with Dr. Proctor. He added that he could not afford to pull anyone off the North Vietnamese logistic problem and that "he saw no point in reexamining the anti-ship missile problem." He noted that USIB had considered this in depth only two months ago, and that since then the Navy had adopted a policy course which "is contrary to what USIB decided upon."

Dr. Hall said that he felt strongly that "to be effective, we must look at this from the standpoint of the consumer and assess how well we are doing." Involving personnel who are already very busy is an in-house problem that can be handled, and the key matter is to determine whether the intelligence community is actually turning out what the consumer needs.

Dr. Proctor said that the proposed studies were "fine" if he could merely bundle up the pertinent materials and deliver them to whoever was to do the study.

Dr. Hall said he did not propose to get in the way of the on-going effort on the North Vietnamese logistics problem.

The Chairman noted that the only way to avoid doing this is to not make the study. He said that the North Vietnam and missile topics are major current areas of interest and new studies would involve major efforts.

Dr. Hall then said that if the Working Group did not want to take up such topics, he could handle the study effort as an in-house problem. He added that "I take it there is a reluctance to look at production."

Both General Bennett and Dr. Proctor denied this. Dr. Proctor said that he had no problem whatever with [redacted] activities or Yugoslavia as study topics.

25X1

The Chairman said that his problem was in determining the purpose of such an exercise and what might be learned from it.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0

Dr. Hall commented that any study the group sponsored ought to be of some current interest, and he didn't see how it would be possible to avoid facing up to the problem of interference with ongoing production activities.

25X1 The Chairman described the current North Vietnamese logistics problem as being one of "high crisis interest" on which effort was being focused 24-hours a day. He noted, however, that Yugoslavia, Libya, and [ ] certainly posed problems of concern to the United States.

Dr. Cline suggested a Latin American or African topic as a possible alternative, and Mr. Marshall commented that selection of another technical subject could fill out the range of topics.

Dr. Proctor said his opposition to another study of the anti-ship missile was related to the fact that it has been studied so much, and Dr. Hall replied that he had listed the anti-ship missile as a topic because it is a matter of such high interest now.

General Bennett said that his concern with this topic was not because of its intelligence aspect but because of recent Navy policy decisions focusing on hard-point defense problems and a lessened interest in the missile threat.

The Chairman suggested that some other technical topics be considered, and Mr. Weiss noted there were some problems relating to SALT that might be of interest.

25X1 At this point the Chairman noted that although Dr. Cline's proposal had not yet been discussed, the meeting had been in session two hours and it was time to adjourn. He asked that each member give further thought to the matter of production topics and submit proposals to the Chairman, who will handle dissemination to all members. Dr. Cline proposed that for each topic proposed, an outline be prepared, and he offered to work up an outline on the [ ] proposal on Dr. Hall's list.

8. The meeting adjourned at 1635 hours. (Date of the next meeting was not set but will be dependent upon the availability of the India/Pakistan study -- the meeting to be scheduled ten days after dissemination of this report.)

25X1A9A

[ ]

Executive Secretary

Distribution:

25X1 orig - PRG Subject (filed NSCIC WG-2)  
1 - Mr. Tweedy

Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0

~~SECRET~~